What’s so special about empirical adequacy? by Bhakthavatsalam,  S. & Cartwright,  N.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
15 February 2017
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Bhakthavatsalam, S. and Cartwright, N. (2017) 'What's so special about empirical adequacy?', European
journal for philosophy of science. .
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-017-0171-7
Publisher's copyright statement:
c© The Author(s) 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide
a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Additional information:
Sindhuja Bhakthavatsalam - Liberal Studies Program, California State University, Northridge. Nancy Cartwright -
Department of Philosophy, Durham University, and Department of Philosophy, UC San Diego.
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
What’s so special about empirical adequacy?1 
 
Sindhuja Bhakthavatsalam and Nancy Cartwright 
 
1. Our thesis 
 
Theory choice has long been a prime topic in philosophy of science: ‘How should we 
choose from among competing theories?’ Theory virtues have also in recent years 
become a standard, closely related topic: 'What virtues should a desirable theory have?' 
'Are the preferred candidates (perhaps simplicity, heterogeneity, or explanatory power) 
symptomatic that a theory is true?' We think that most of this discussion is misguided. 
The fundamental problem is that, even where truth has been eschewed as the aim in view, 
the considerations raised for theory choice are still trained on truth – and on its fellow 
traveler, empirical adequacy, the sine qua non for truth. Even if we want other virtues in 
a theory like say, simplicity, it is assumed that we first winnow down to theories that are 
(at least roughly) empirically adequate. We think that this approach is off on the wrong 
foot: empirical adequacy is a poor starting point that could have us picking from among 
the wrong theories in many contexts. For many purposes that science aims to serve, the 
theories we choose need not be anything like empirically adequate, and as we will argue, 
in some cases empirical adequacy is a positive vice.  
 
2. Empirical adequacy and theoretical virtues 
 
It is good to start with a definition of 'empirical adequacy', but it turns out to be difficult 
to find one in the philosophical literature
2
. We think that what is usually intended is 
something like this: a theory (or model or set of scientific claims) is empirically adequate 
when the claims it makes about empirical phenomena – or at least the bulk of these 
claims, or the central ones – are correct, or approximately correct enough, where some 
                                                 
1
 We want to thank Bas van Fraassen, Kyle Stanford, Ian James Kidd, Chris Wüthrich, 
and Craig Callender for helpful discussion. Cartwright’s research for this paper has 
received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European 
Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement No. 667526 
K4U). 
2
 Bas van Fraassen's (1980) definition – a theory is empirically adequate if it gets right 
the claims the theory makes about observable objects – is often referred to. But we think 
that this is not really what is generally meant since it demands getting right all these 
claims, including the infinite host of claims about never-to-be-observed observables; and 
also because many of the facts theories imply about observable objects involve properties 
almost anyone would label as theoretical.  
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distinction between empirical and theoretical phenomena is supposed. We shall assume 
this usage and leave aside the question of what counts as empirical and what as 
theoretical. The question at the heart of this paper is, ‘Why privilege empirical adequacy 
among theoretical virtues?’  
 
The mistake about requiring empirical adequacy of our theories is connected with a 
familiar but ill-explained notion associated with theory choice – that of acceptability. It is 
often debated what makes a theory acceptable. But whatever it is, empirical adequacy is 
almost always taken as a basic requirement for a theory to be acceptable. But what is 
acceptability? The fourth definition in the Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English 
(Concise OED) (1990) connects accepting with believing ‘as adequate or valid’, which 
could implicate empirical adequacy in this context if we attend to ‘valid’ as opposed to 
‘adequate’ and take ‘valid’ as equivalent to true and not as the Concise OED itself 
defines it, as ‘sound or defensible’.  But if ‘believing to be true’ is what we are talking 
about, why don't we just say so? It seems a special failing in philosophers to use one term 
when another is more straightforward. At any rate, if this is the question intended, we 
have no quarrel with empirical adequacy as an indicator of acceptance in at least one 
direction: a theory with false implications cannot be true, whether its implications are 
about empirical phenomena or something else. But there are lots of other things one can 
do under the heading ‘accept’. 
 
The first definition of 'accept' in the Concise OED has to do with consenting to receive. 
This one is our focus. 'Acceptable' in this sense is (at least) a 2-place relation: things are 
not just received full stop, but rather for some purposes and not for others. When it comes 
to scientific enquiries, these are received and employed for a great variety of purposes. 
Empirical adequacy is necessary for none we can think of besides truth of the theory. (Of 
course, many non-realists who are not concerned with truth are also preoccupied with 
empirical adequacy. Bas van Fraasen's The Scientific Image is a classic example. The aim 
of science, says The Scientific Image, is to produce theories that are empirically adequate  
– even though truth is not the ultimate aim. We return to this below.) 
 
Put baldy, our thesis may seem obvious. But it does not seem to be so in practice. 
Consider the discourse on theoretical virtues. At least since Popper (1935) and Kuhn 
(1977) these have almost always been presented as characteristics one might wish for in a 
theory in addition to empirical adequacy. For instance, according to Heather Douglas 
(2012), “There are values that are genuinely truth assuring, in the minimal sense that their 
absence indicates a clear epistemic problem.” (2012) These according to her are the 
basic, minimal criteria for adequate science, and they include empirical adequacy and 
internal consistency; the others are mere “ideal desiderata”. Douglas admits that in 
practice scientists may aim for characteristics like simplicity and potential explanatory 
power even when the minimal criteria of empirical adequacy and internal consistency 
fail. But, she maintains,  
 
This must be done with the full acknowledgement that the theory is inadequate as 
it stands, and that it must be corrected to meet the minimum requirements as 
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quickly as possible. Although philosophers like to quip that every scientific theory 
is ‘born falsified’, no scientist should be happy about it. (2012, 6)  
 
However, she concedes that in addition to the minimal criterion of empirical adequacy 
(and internal consistency) – which, as she describes, is a virtue of a theory “in relation to 
evidence” – it would be good to aim for other virtues, like simplicity and scope. 
 
When truth is the goal, it makes sense to take empirical adequacy as a requirement and 
other virtues as desiderata, useful for other purposes in addition. But there is an opposing 
standpoint that does not take truth to be the goal of science, maybe because there is no 
such thing as the goal of science, or because truth is unobtainable, or because we would 
never know it we had it, or because one wants science to do something other than 
accumulate truths, possibly many other things.  Douglas is right in that lack of empirical 
adequacy poses an epistemic concern. But science often has concerns that are not 
epistemic. In this context our question is not just a matter for philosophy. It has serious 
cash value. If we need a theory to do a job that can be done well even by theories that are 
false or empirically inadequate, why restrict our choice to those that are empirically 
adequate? Consider an analogy. We need a knife to cut bread. Why buy a multitasking 
Swiss Army knife that is not only more expensive than a bread knife but also cuts bread 
considerably less well? Similarly, when we want a theory that's simple but need not be 
true to do a job in view, why take on the dual burden of finding a theory that is both 
empirically adequate and simple? Surely this is foolish unless we have reason to think 
empirically adequate theories serve the purposes at hand – those that simplicity is 
supposed to serve – better than theories that are not empirically adequate. As with knives 
for cutting bread, we shall argue, so too with theories. Demanding a virtue that fits the 
theory for an additional job can not only be costly but it can narrow our choices to ones 
that don't do the job we want at all well.  
 
So far we have been discussing the pursuit of empirical adequacy as a stepping-stone to 
finding a true theory. But well-known anti-realists have also embraced empirical 
adequacy, for instance the logical positivists. Why? How did they answer our question: 
what’s so special about empirical adequacy? Many supposed that only claims that can be 
confirmed by observation are meaningful. But under the influence of Hanson, 
Feyerabend, Kuhn, and others, most philosophers have come to reject i) the theory of 
meaning that this claim presupposes, ii) the possibility of distinguishing what can be 
confirmed through observation and what not (do we see through a microscope?), and iii) 
the theory neutrality of observation itself.  
 
Van Fraassen’s The Scientific Image (1980) champions an empiricism that avoids these 
pitfalls; what he calls 'constructive empiricism': the aim of science is to be empirically 
adequate, where, as he defines it, a theory is empirically adequate if it gets right the facts 
it implies about the objects that are observable by us. He avoids the pitfalls by arguing 
that it is a matter of empirical fact what objects are and are not observable by us, by 
contrast with the question of which features of objects are theoretical and which 
observable. He tells us in addition that while accepting a theory has to do with pragmatics 
and with how well the theory serves specific purposes, acceptance is also to take the 
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theory to be empirically adequate: this does not sound like a definition but rather an 
injunction.  
 
With respect to acceptance, as we said above, our focus is on receiving the theory for 
specific purposes, and this does not seem to be shared by van Fraassen given his 
discussion of theory virtues. He allows that scientists may in pursuit of usable and useful 
theories demand pragmatic virtues that may have nothing to do with saying things as they 
are about the empirical world, like simplicity, scope, and explanatory power. He also 
does not argue for the superiority of empirical adequacy over pragmatic virtues in settling 
on what theory to use or to pursue. This may make it sound as if our views converge. But 
no. According to The Scientific Image while scientists can have pragmatic aims, the aim 
of science is empirical adequacy. This simply invites a reformulation of our question: 
what’s so special about this aim from among all others? Van Fraassen does not give good 
reasons for why this should be so. 
 
Van Frassen does distinguish empirical adequacy as a ‘semantic’ virtue – one having to 
do with saying things about the world the way they are – as opposed to the other 
‘pragmatic’ virtues. But if we are not aiming for true theories, then why care especially 
for semantic virtues? If we’re not aiming for true theories, the fact that empirical 
adequacy is a necessary condition for success at that aim becomes irrelevant and there 
must be some other reason to aim for empirical adequacy. We can think of one, which we 
introduce by another analogy. We do not think that this is the kind of defense that either 
van Fraassen or the realists would choose to mount. But then we pose this as a challenge 
for further discussion: if not this, then what?  
 
Suppose your sole concern is shopping and you want to be assured of a certain level of 
reliable quality without your having to do any thinking at all, regardless of whether you 
are buying pickles or sunscreen, a sweater or a refrigerator. And this demand for quality 
coupled with a demand for a one-stop-shop for everything with minimal thought and 
research trumps all. Then you should be willing to drive hundreds of miles, spend vast 
amounts, and stand in long check-out queues to get access to a shop or set of shops that 
sells everything you need and of the quality you want. You should be willing to do so 
even if a variety of local shops can supply the very goods you buy, of the same quality 
and far more cheaply – but you would have to think about which shop to go to for which 
goods (and not, for instance, expect the butcher to sell you a sweater), and you would 
have to notice that some of the local shops have shoddy offerings. Similarly imagine your 
sole concern is to predict a variety of empirical facts accurately; you have no other aim.  
You couple that with the demand that you should be able to do so without ever having to 
think what theory to use for what prediction. Then aiming for a large set of empirically 
adequate theories makes good sense: we would be able to use any theory from within that 
set without thought to make empirical predictions. But it can be excessively costly and it 
can get in the way of important aims you might have other than predicting empirical 
results without having to reflect on the theory to use to do so. 
 
To make this case, we will focus on two very broad purposes of science and scientists 
shared across many scientific endeavors: a) gaining understanding of the world and b) 
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managing the world. We choose these two because they are widely accepted as 
fundamental goals of science and because these are two areas where we have found 
others very resistant to our campaign against empirical adequacy. Sure, ‘getting it right’ 
about something or other can matter to these two jobs, but getting these things right 
would not count as empirical adequacy in anybody's books. Theories can do these two 
jobs very well and still be very wrong in the bulk of their empirical predictions. Our view 
is similar to Kevin Elliot and Daniel McKaughan’s (2014): 
 
Scientists need not always maximize the fit between a model and the world; 
rather, the purposes of the users determine what sort of fit with the world (and 
therefore what balance between epistemic and non-epistemic considerations) is 
needed in particular contexts. Scientists use models and theories to represent the 
world for specific purposes, and if they can serve those purposes best by 
sacrificing some epistemic features for the sake of non-epistemic ones, it is 
entirely legitimate for them to do so. (4) 
 
We concede that truth – or for many anti-realists, just plain empirical adequacy – might 
be important for various reasons: for its own sake, for finding some kind of teleological 
meaning or purpose to one’s scientific life and work (taking one’s theories to be heading 
towards the truth might give meaning to a scientist’s work), etc. But to mandate empirical 
adequacy as a minimum criterion for a scientific theory is entirely unreasonable and just 
wrong. 
 
One consequence of dislodging empirical adequacy from pride of place in theory choice 
that we hope will follow in train is a new set of focuses in the discourse on theoretical 
virtues. Virtues must be fit for purpose. If different theories are chosen on different 
occasions to serve different purposes, we almost certainly will find on closer inspection 
that scientists call a great number of virtues into play beyond philosophy's usual suspects. 
What are they? Which virtues are used in practice to select for which purposes? Can we 
find warrant for these practices? 
 
Although we provide several examples from scientific practice to illustrate our 
arguments, we want to urge that these are illustrations, not arguments. Our normative 
account of the role of empirical adequacy in science does not depend on the (descriptive) 
examples from scientific practice. Our arguments against the primacy of empirical 
adequacy among theoretical virtues stand on their own and should be persuasive – we 
hope – even without theses instances from scientific practice to illustrate and support 
them. 
 
 
3. In pursuit of understanding  
 
Here we don’t give a single account of understanding, and for a good philosophic reason. 
Understanding, we claim, is not a natural kind; it is an ordinary human concept. It is used 
almost everywhere, from everyday life to the natural and social sciences, history, 
theology, the law courts, and the arts, in different loosely related ways to serve different 
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loosely related purposes. We will look instead at many currently popular accounts in 
philosophy of science, which we group into three categories, that arguably capture 
reasonable, though different, senses of scientific understanding, to see how empirical 
adequacy fares with them.  
 
Scientific understanding, as Henk de Regt, Sabina Leonelli, and Kai Eigner (2009) have 
pointed out, is a three-term relation involving a model, explanation, or other vehicle, the 
target that we want to understand, and an agent, the understander. Although agency is an 
important aspect of scientific understanding, there seems to be a rough division of labor 
in philosophy. Epistemology focuses on agency – what characteristics an agent must have 
and what they must do in order to understand (cf. the recent spate of work in 
epistemology on ‘grasping’3). Philosophy of science has by contrast not been much 
concerned with what is in the heads of agents, or what they do in understanding 
something, but rather with the public products of science that can provide understanding, 
the vehicles of understanding – explanations, theories, models etc. That is what our 
discussion will focus on.  
 
One could categorize types of understanding discussed in recent philosophy of science 
literature according to kinds of vehicles (e.g theories, models, narratives, and images) or 
perhaps according to what is to be understood (e.g. a happening, a general phenomenon, a 
regularity, a domain of happenings, even 'the world as a whole').  To explore our claim, 
we find an alternative categorization – realist, counterfactual, and pragmatic 
understandings – more useful.  As you will notice these classes are only roughly 
characterized; nor are they mutually independent since there are examples that fall into 
multiple categories. But they should suffice to show that empirical adequacy is not 
needed for understanding as understanding is conceived on a great many current 
philosophic accounts. We shall spend the most time on realist understanding because we 
take it that this is where the case for empirical adequacy is strongest. We shall then turn 
to other senses of ‘scientific understanding’ that philosophers have developed in which 
the importance of empirical adequacy does not seem so apparent from the start. 
 
 
I. Realist Understanding 
 
Realist, yes, but realist about what? In the philosophy of science literature ‘realist’ 
usually has to do with whatever it is that theory presents as responsible for, or (in 
whatever is one’s preferred sense) ‘explaining’  phenomena, such as ‘underlying’ causes, 
structures, general principles, or theoretical laws–. We shall start there, considering cases 
where the understanding of some phenomena is provided by a theoretical representation 
of the laws or causes  supposed to be responsible for them, and we shall suppose, since 
we are dealing here with ‘realist’ understanding, that understanding requires that the 
representation get it right, or at least right enough about what matters most.  
 
                                                 
3
 See for instance Khalifa (2013), Grimm (2010), Strevens (2013)  
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Besides theoretical laws and underlying causes, one can be realist about a good many 
other things. For instance, suppose one has what might be thought of as a thoroughly 
empiricist notion of understanding, that for a theory or model to provide understanding, it 
has to get right the empirical facts that follow from it. Here one is being ‘realist’ about 
the empirical facts. This kind of realist understanding would of course require empirical 
adequacy. Many other accounts of understanding look to something that is neither 
theoretical laws and causes nor just empirical facts. They look to things like the ‘overall 
picture’, the ‘world as a whole’, the ‘patterns’, the ‘similarities’, or the ‘categories’ and 
‘natural kinds’ in nature. One can be realist about these too: there is indeed a forest to be 
seen, not just the trees; there genuinely are patterns; things genuinely are similar or 
dissimilar in ways that matter; some category schemes represent natural kinds, not just 
classifications we impose on the world. Realist understanding in these cases means 
getting the right overall picture, or representing patterns, similarities or categories as they 
really are. 
 
We should note that here we neither endorse nor deny realism about any of these. Each 
has been linked with understanding, and in each case it seems the understanding could be 
either realist or pragmatist. (We get to the latter at the end of this section.) We take the 
realist interpretation because it poses the bigger challenge to our views. After all, it seems 
far less surprising that an erroneous representation of laws or causes or patterns will 
produce erroneous empirical predictions than that a true one will. 
 
 
1. Understanding via vehicles that get the theory approximately right  
 
Here is one widely held view about scientific theories and theoretical models: in order for 
a theoretical account to give us genuine understanding of a phenomenon, the theory has 
to get (at least most of) the theoretical facts cited in the account right. Truth about 
theoretical causes and laws may not be sufficient for understanding – we might demand a 
theory or model to be visualizable, simple, explanatory, etc., but – it’s thought – it is 
necessary.
4
 We do not agree with this thesis since we embrace the variety of kinds of 
understanding that we discuss. However, we think this is a significant kind of 
understanding that many scientists aim for, and they often intend it to be realist 
understanding. Our point here is that even when the understanding of a phenomenon is 
via seeing the theoretical laws or causes responsible for it and even when what we’re 
aiming for is a kind of realist understanding, the vehicle that provides that understanding 
need not be empirically adequate. 
 
How is this possible? The short answer is that understanding comes in degrees. A vehicle 
can be empirically inadequate – hence theoretically not ‘all true’ – but can get right some 
                                                 
4 De Regt (2014) refers to (a more general version of) this as ‘the realist thesis regarding 
understanding’ and has argued against it at length, specifically focusing on what we call 
‘pragmatic understanding’, which we get to later in this paper. 
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or many of the important theoretical features of the target and hence afford a degree of 
(realist) understanding of it. 
 
 It may be useful to think in terms of two different kinds of case here. One is the familiar 
case of ‘idealizing models’, on which there is a lot of literature. Roughly, these get some 
of the significant theoretical structure of what is to be understood fairly precisely right. 
The second, which we call ‘rough proximates’, gets significant parts, or perhaps all, of 
the structure right but only very roughly. In this case, we may think of the vehicle as 
providing understanding because it stands in stark contrast with what is otherwise 
available, which is not even roughly right. Sometimes, perhaps because for the purposes 
for which one wants to understand something, the departure in detail from the right 
account does not matter. We suspect there is far more to be said about these and we try to 
separate them from the ‘idealization’ cases to encourage more attention to them. We’ll 
discuss these first, then turn to ‘idealizations’. 
 
a. Rough proximates. Take the Rutherford model of the atom. Today the model is 
considered to be theoretically grossly inaccurate. According to modern quantum 
mechanical models, the electron does not revolve around the nucleus in planetary orbits 
as the Rutherford model pictures. The model is also empirically inadequate: it predicts 
that the electron will continuously lose energy and spiral into the nucleus causing the 
atom to collapse – and of course, atoms don’t collapse for if they did, matter wouldn’t 
exist the way it does. Despite these flaws the Rutherford model affords us some degree of 
(realist) understanding of atomic structure.  
 
As realist understanding would have it, suppose we take correctness of theoretical 
features as one standard for evaluating the understanding provided by a model and take 
our current models to be more correct than older ones. Then the Rutherford model was on 
the path to these more correct models – it was significantly more correct than its 
predecessor, the plum pudding model, which takes the atom to be a ‘pudding’ of positive 
charge with electrons embedded in it. The Rutherford model was part of a chain of 
continually improving models comprising the Bohr model, the Bohr-Sommerfeld model, 
and the modern cloud model. As Catherine Elgin (2009) points out, understanding comes 
in degrees. We can think of the Rutherford model as a starting point. After all, it tells us 
that the positive charges in an atom are concentrated in a central nucleus containing 
protons and neutrons, and electrons surround it – a feature it shares with even the most 
modern model of the atom.  
 
There is one clear sense of understanding – the sense of realist understanding – in which 
a model that gets just right the theoretical features of a target phenomenon and is hence 
empirically adequate can be taken to give us great understanding. In the same sense, one 
that is false and empirically inadequate can give us some, less-than-perfect (realist) 
understanding of the target owing to being somewhere in the vicinity of the true 
theoretical story: the atom is something like what the model says, and the model is better 
than others that are nowhere close to the theoretically true story. But why settle for partial 
understanding? For one, it is better than no understanding at all, and further, there are 
many situations in which our aim is ‘some understanding’ – when explaining things to 
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children for instance, where the correct/true story can be too complex. For example, as 
Elgin (2009) points out, a child’s understanding of evolution according to which humans 
descended from apes is better than one according to which humans descended from 
butterflies. This could be a reason why the Rutherford model still finds a place in school 
science textbooks.  
 
So models and theories that depart from the full theoretical truth and that may in 
consequence make wrong predictions about significant empirical facts
5
 can still provide 
partial realist understanding. So empirical adequacy is not necessary for partial realist 
understanding. More, it is not even a good clue. It might be presumed that ceteris paribus, 
if V1 and V2 are both vehicles of understanding of a phenomenon X, and V1 is more 
empirically adequate than V2, V1 provides better partial realist understanding of X than 
V2.
6
 This would be a mistake. There are a great many models that get right a great 
number of central empirical predictions, including ones that are deemed central from the 
point of view of a ‘true’ account, and yet are wide off the mark theoretically. This brings 
us to into the very familiar, much worked over philosophical territory of 
underdetermination, unconceived alternatives, and the like, so we will not have more to 
say here.  
 
b. Idealizations.  Scientific models often contain idealizations, exaggerations, and 
omissions of certain features of the target and thus deviate from the true theoretical story, 
and in consequence can be empirically inadequate. How do idealized models give 
understanding? There is a large literature on models; since we are concerned narrowly 
with understanding here, we concentrate on Elgin, who addresses this explicitly. Elgin 
(2012) calls idealizations, omissions etc. that enhance understanding, ‘felicitous 
falsehoods’. According to Elgin7 an idealized model can exemplify – highlight, exhibit, 
or display – characteristics it shares with the true causes, laws, or mechanisms 
responsible for the phenomenon it purports to explain. In doing so, Elgin argues, the 
model provides understanding of, and affords epistemic access to, those features in a way 
a more accurate model would not because the more accurate model introduces 
complexities that mask the features we care about. So it can provide more understanding 
than one that is more accurate but more complicated.  
 
Idealized models of the kind Elgin discusses are likely to be empirically inadequate 
owing to the several theoretical falsehoods they contain. One nice example comes from 
Nobel Prize winning economist Rodolfo Manuelli (1986), commenting on the models of 
another Chicago School Nobel Prize winner, Edward Prescott:  
 
                                                 
5
 Though they could both provide partial, but only partial, realist understanding and still 
be empirically adequate if they introduce the right compensating ‘falsehoods’ to correct 
the predictions without obscuring the features that provide the partial understanding.  
6
 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this formulation. 
7
 Also long argued by Cartwright (1983), Morgan and Morrison (1999), Wimsatt (2007) 
and others. 
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.... consider the models Prescott surveys ... Most of them are representative agent 
models. Formally, the models assume a large number of consumers, but they are 
specialised by assuming also that the consumers are identical. One of the 
consequences of this specialisation is a very sharp prediction about the volume of 
trade: it is zero. If explaining observations on the volume of trade is considered 
essential to an analysis, this prediction is enough to dismiss such models. But if 
accounting for individual fluctuations beyond the component explained by 
aggregate fluctuations is not considered essential to understand the effects of 
business cycles, the abstraction is not unreasonable. A case can even be made that 
if what matters, in terms of utility, is the behavior of aggregate consumption and 
leisure, then any model that helps explain movements in the two variables is 
useful in evaluating alternative policies. This usefulness is independent of the 
ability of the model to explain other observations. (1986, 5)  
 
In this model – as Elgin would (rightly) claim – the effects of the aggregate behavior 
would be obscured if we took into account individual fluctuations. We gain 
understanding since the model depicts vividly what is supposed to be the correct 
mechanism for generating a business cycle, which depends on average behavior, though 
at the cost of getting woefully wrong some effects that depend on the distribution.  
 
One specific kind of idealization that illustrates our point is what Cartwright (2006) calls 
'Galilean thought experiments' and Uskali Mäki (1994), ‘isolating models’: models that 
study what a single one (or small set) of the many causes of an empirical effect in a target 
setting contributes separately. This kind of vehicle necessarily distorts the setting in 
which the effect occurs and the effect it predicts will be different, often dramatically, 
from the effect that happens. But they nonetheless get right just what the particular cause 
in question contributes to that overall effects. They provide genuine realist understanding 
of an element of the theoretical structure responsible for that effect and how that element 
contributes. 
 
2. Understanding via vehicles that get other things that matter right 
 
Here we take up some oft-discussed aspects of ‘unification’ in the philosophy of science 
literature.  
 
a. The 'overall' picture. Many philosophers of science have urged unification as a source 
of understanding. Michael Friedman (1974) is one famous example. According to 
Friedman, the understanding unification provides is global as opposed to local. Unifying 
explanations may not increase our understanding of independent phenomena, but they 
increase our understanding of phenomena overall. They do so by giving us a picture of 
the world ‘as a whole’ not just as a collection of separate parts. He explains: “From the 
fact that all bodies obey the laws of mechanics it follows that the planets behave as they 
do, falling bodies behave as they do, and gases behave as they do. …. [W]e have reduced 
a multiplicity of unexplained, independent phenomena to one”.(15, italics as in original) 
For Friedman this reduction is the very “essence of scientific explanation”: “A world 
with fewer independent phenomena is, other things equal, more comprehensible than one 
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with more.” (15) As Friedman pictures it, this kind of understanding by unification 
requires that the unifying theory be true. It is supposed that it is a fact that all bodies obey 
the laws of mechanics, a fact that embraces a good many others. In consequence the 
unifying theory must also be empirically adequate. 
 
But a unifying theory need not state the facts to give us a true picture – the right picture – 
of the world (or of a particular domain within it) ‘as a whole’, reducing the number of 
independent phenomena and making the world more comprehensible.  We can invoke 
Cartwright's (1980) early arguments from The Truth Doesn't Explain Much
8
 about what 
are generally deemed to be our very best unifying theories – the unifying 'high' theories in 
physics – to defend the view that a unifying theory may be as good at this job as can be 
and yet not be true. It can give us an excellent picture of the world as a whole, so long as 
we do not then expect to see the details correctly. Cartwright based her claims on the way 
she saw scientific modeling working in practice. The behavior of the planets does not 
‘follow from’ the laws of mechanics. Rather, we derive the details of their behaviour. We 
do so starting from those laws, but in the course of our derivations we distort what the 
laws say. The corrections are not unmotivated. A great deal of knowledge from other 
domains, and lots of experienced practice, goes into it. But they are ad hoc from the point 
of view of mechanics.  
 
Even though, on an account like Cartwright’s, the laws are not true, still they may be the 
very best and indeed an excellent – and thus ‘the correct’ – way to see ‘as one’ all the 
disparate phenomena we derive from them. We might liken this to the kind of realism 
about the choice of laws that many advocates of the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis ‘best system’ 
account of laws seem to adopt. On the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account, the laws are the 
simplest set of claims from which we can derive the widest set of phenomena. Of course 
one may suspect that there is no ‘best’ system. But many act as if there is and that 
fundamental physics is on its way to finding it, perhaps even to finding one ‘simple’ 
system from which all facts can be derived. What we’d like to point out is that this kind 
of realism about the system – that there is one unique best one – is independent of 
whether the lower level facts ‘follow from’ the unifying laws, as Friedman pictures it, or 
we derive them, with distortions, as Cartwright sees it.  
 
So, a theory may give us an understanding of a domain ‘as whole’ without being true to 
any of the phenomena in that domain. This can be classed a kind of realist understanding, 
supposing that we can be right or wrong about what the best picture of the whole is.  How 
does empirical adequacy fare for this kind of understanding? The answer is immediate. 
The unifying theory that provides the understanding will generally be far less empirically 
adequate than the lower-level theories it unifies.  
 
Perhaps we should recall at this stage that we are not committed one way or the other to 
realism about any of the items we discuss. For those who think that there is no right or 
wrong about the choice of a unifying theory when no such theory is true, it seems the 
                                                 
8 
Also see Cartwright  (1983) for similar arguments 
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understanding provided by unification would then be, in our system of classification, not 
‘realist’ but rather ‘pragmatic’: it make things more comprehensible to us. But in this 
sense it seems to need no argument that a theory can at one and the same time improve 
comprehensibility and diminish empirical adequacy. 
 
b. The natural classifications for laws. This is the central job of theory according to 
Pierre Duhem, who thought that successful physics categorizes empirical laws in a way 
that progressively reflects an underlying ‘natural’ classification and it is still reflected in 
how physics theory is organized today. Consider for example theories in physics with 
well-known names: Newton’s theory of gravity, Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism, 
Einstein’s theory of relativity, quantum gravity, or string theory. Whether these theories 
are true or not, they organize empirical phenomena under them in a way that allows for 
subject-specialization in physics and the detailed comprehension that goes with it that 
promotes new visions, new practices, and what gets called ‘the growth of knowledge. 
Even if one argues that this is a realist understanding – that there is a right way to sort 
laws together into separate categories (as some take to be Duhem’s view9) –  as with the 
overall picture, when we formulate laws in ways that make them fit in tidy categories, the 
laws so formulated may be less empirically adequate than when they could be formulated 
just so, so as to get the empirical phenomena exactly right. 
 
c. Patterns.  It is sometimes said that theory supplies understanding by revealing the 
patterns in nature. On this view, in Philip Kitcher’s (1989) words, “Understanding the 
phenomena is not simply a matter of reducing the "fundamental incomprehensibilities" 
but of seeing connections, common patterns, in what initially appeared to be different 
situations.” (pp. 81-82) Often these patterns are taken to be real: there is a fact of the 
matter about what patterns there are and just what they are like.
10
 In this case the 
understanding supplied is a realist understanding.  
 
Still, when a theory supplies understanding by correctly showing patterns in the world, 
just as when it supplies understanding by reducing the number of independent variables 
or showing the overall picture or getting the laws placed in the right categories, it may 
well be less empirically adequate than a theory that aims just for empirical adequacy with 
no attention to making the patterns visible. The reason can be similar in all these cases. 
As with Elgin's 'felicitous falsehoods', often the best way to bring out similarities and 
differences or to show overall patterns or how things fit together is by using a 
representation that is an average, or blur, or idealization of the real things that is not true 
to any of them. This is widely recognized in the case of seeing the trees as a forest, where 
it is clear that in seeing them as a forest we both lose and misrepresent a lot of empirical 
detail. Similarly, we can see and appreciate the pattern even if each individual piece is 
not entirely accurately represented and departs in various ways from it. And seeing things 
together that are very much alike is a way of understanding them that is in no way 
dependent on either the truth or the empirical adequacy of the vehicle that unites them. 
                                                 
9
 Though Bhakthavatsalam (2015) argues against this simple reading of Duhem. 
10
 See for instance, Ladyman et al (2007), Ishida (2007). 
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II. Counterfactual Understanding 
 
Often there is understanding of the world to be had from vehicles not owing to their 
having any proximity to truth or empirical adequacy – so the vehicles need not be 
remotely true or empirically adequate. One kind of understanding that fits this bill is 
counterfactual understanding: understanding that comes from being able to see 
counterfactual possibilities. (See Lipton (2009) for a fairly detailed account of this kind 
of understanding.) We will consider counterfactual understanding of three different kinds. 
 
1. Understanding via vehicles that provide simple make-believe models 
 
One way to provide counterfactual understanding is by constructing simple make-believe, 
often very diagrammatic, worlds, frequently described in highly abstract terms or, where 
more concrete terminology is used, the descriptions are meant to carry little of their 
ordinary content.   
 
Consider George Akerlof’s (1970) model of the car market. The model pictures an 
abstractly described cause – asymmetric information – and a concretely but thinly 
characterized effect: a big difference in price between new and slightly used cars.  In the 
model, asymmetric information in constituted by the seller of the car having much 
relevant information about its condition; the buyer, little. As a result, the price a rational 
buyer will offer for a used car depends on the average quality of used cars on the market; 
the price that a seller will accept depends on the quality of that particular vehicle. 
Therefore, one will not sell a used car that has a quality higher than the average across the 
used car population. Rational buyers, knowing this, will further reduce the price they 
offer, which causes sellers to withhold even more cars and so on. Ultimately the market 
collapses and no used cars are offered for sale.  
 
This is of course a bad prediction about the sale of used cars in the real world. In so far as 
we think that the difference in knowledge about cars is working in real world cases as it 
does in the model but results are different because the model ignores the other causes at 
work (e.g., used car salespersons’ care for their reputation) we could place this example 
in the category of partial realist understanding. There are a few reasons for putting it here 
instead. First is that it does give us counterfactual understanding of whether and how 
asymmetric information affects car sales in a world where no other causes are present. 
The idea is that if we lived in a world where asymmetric information were the only cause, 
then the used car market would collapse. This gives us not just (realist) understanding of 
this alternate world, but also (counterfactual) understanding of our world. For instance, 
with this model in view a government might successfully implement very strong full 
disclosure legislation for car sellers that eliminates asymmetric information.  The Akerlof 
model would then give us very good counterfactual understanding of why that car market 
works so well, even though it does not depict any mechanism that exists there – this 
particular market works well in part because the government has eliminated the 
opportunity for sellers to have better information about their cars than buyers do.  
Striving for empirical adequacy would hinder the model from illustrating this possibility. 
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A second reason is that the model is not used primarily to understand car markets but 
rather to understand what happens, or could happen, or does not happen in a huge variety 
of quite different situations from asset pricing to the signing of the Magna Carta.  This 
contrasts with the usual examples of Galilean idealization; for instance, the model of how 
bodies move when gravity alone is at work is generally used to help us understand real 
world motions. But Akerlof’s model about what would happen to a car market were 
differences in knowledge of cars’ features and history at work unimpeded is supposed to 
help us understand why the Magna Carta was signed.  
 
Independent of where the understanding these models provide should be catalogued, it 
should be clear that models like this will not get better at supplying that kind of 
understanding just by increasing their empirical adequacy, and for the most part, they 
would probably get worse at it.  
 
Another example of a model that can be seen as giving counterfactual understanding is 
economist Thomas Schelling’s (1978) checkerboard model, which gives a story about 
racial segregation. It is easy to see how neighborhoods would be racially segregated if 
individuals have strong discriminatory preferences. But this simple scenario does not 
make us understand how people could be segregated if they prefer mixed neighborhoods. 
To understand this, Schelling distributes nickels and dimes on a checkerboard. Coins are 
moved to new locations where they are less outnumbered depending on how many of 
their neighbors are the same denomination. Schelling found that even when coins are not 
moved unless 2/3 or more of their neighbors are different, ultimately the coins bunch into 
neighborhoods all of the same denomination.  
 
This model talks about coins on a checkerboard and predicts how their locations will 
bunch. It makes no empirical predictions about people and segregation. What it does is 
far more subtle and interesting. It deals with a possible situation. As Aydinonat Emrah 
(2007) notes, the model is constructed to provide insight into how certain individual 
mechanisms that real people may display (i.e. individual tendencies to avoid a minority 
status) may interact under certain conditions to produce segregation.  But that’s not what 
the descriptions in the model stand for.  
 
Do we slip into relativism here? Can any old model that constructs a make-believe world 
give us counterfactual understanding of some aspects of the real world? No: Schelling’s 
model makes a plausible conjecture that segregation may be the unintended consequence 
of even mild discriminatory preferences – and this is based on our familiarity with real 
people and their preferences. In this way it is consistent with our real world in key 
respects, like its assumptions about people.  
 
The Schelling model does not tell us that mild discriminatory preferences do result in 
large segregation, but it opens our minds to a previously unimagined possibility – who’d 
have thought that such mild racial preferences could lead to complete segregation in a 
world quite similar to ours? Here then is a case of a celebrated model in economics – 
celebrated for providing insight into, and what we are labeling ‘counterfactual 
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understanding’ of, racial segregation – where empirical adequacy simply does not figure. 
The model is empirically sterile with respect to the issues it gives insight into – making 
no predictions about them at all. 
 
2. Understanding via vehicles that show up impossibilities revealed by ‘failed’ ideas from 
the past 
 
Consider again the Rutherford model. In addition to the realist understanding it gives, it 
also gives us counterfactual understanding. Owing to its empirically incorrect prediction 
about the inward spiraling of the electron, it shows how an atom couldn’t be: it illustrates 
a physical impossibility. While the model was proposed by Rutherford in the hopes of 
giving realist understanding understanding since it, today we can use it for gaining 
counterfactual understanding: if electrons revolved around the nucleus the way the model 
says they do, then matter couldn’t exist as we know it.  
 
We’d again like to stress that this plays a particularly significant role in science teaching. 
The Rutherford model was an important step in the evolution of ideas about atomic 
structure in the history of science, as it is in a science learner’s progression of ideas about 
the phenomenon. In Kuhnian jargon, within the Rutherford paradigm – given the results 
of his gold foil experiment – the model seemed very plausible. So before being 
introduced to the idea of an accelerated charged particle losing energy, students of 
science will likely appreciate Rutherford’s model. Once they are introduced to this 
conflicting idea of the spiraling electron, they will be able to see why an atom simply 
couldn’t be the way Rutherford thought it was. Similar arguments can be made about 
gaining understanding from other ‘failed’ ideas such as luminiferous ether, the 
heliocentric model of the solar system, and so on. The understanding we gain here seems 
especially significant when we look at the study of science as a study of the evolution of 
scientific ideas. And it’s worth noting that understanding here squarely depends on 
empirical inadequacy! 
 
3. Understanding via vehicles that provide plausible explanatory stories 
 
Empirically inadequate plausible explanatory stories can give us understanding by 
showing how things can be consistent with facts we insist on, such as accepted theory. 
Consider the MIT bag model. It describes hadrons (particles like protons and neutrons) as 
‘bags’ in which (two or three) quarks are spatially confined, forced by external pressure. 
This takes into consideration the fact that quarks have never been found in isolation and 
are hence thought to be spatially confined. With the help of boundary conditions and 
suitable approximations, the single model parameter (bag pressure) can be adjusted to fit 
hadronic observables (e.g. mass and charge). Stephen Hartmann (1999, 336) observes 
that the predictions of the model only very modestly agree with empirical data. By 
normal empirical standards, the model fares badly. Are quarks really confined the way 
described in the model? We don’t know – and if empirical adequacy is a guide to truth, 
then very probably not.  
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Hartmann asks why physicists entertain the model, despite its empirical shortcomings. 
His answer is that it provides a “plausible story” by which it enhances our understanding. 
The bag model is a “narrative told around the formalism of the theory”; it is consistent 
with the theory; and importantly, it gives a plausible, intuitive, and visualizable picture of 
a hadron as quarks confined in a bag. Here we also get modal understanding. To the 
question, ‘How could quarks be spatially confined?’, this model answers, ‘Possibly, as if 
they were in a bag’. The answer is a good one because it is easily visualizable and 
because it illustrates a possibility about quark confinement.  
 
A common response is that the model is itself understandable, but it does not provide 
understanding of the target if it is not reasonably empirically adequate to it – we 
understand the model, but not the target. No, Hartmann contends: “[A] qualitative story, 
which establishes an explanatory link between the fundamental theory and a model, plays 
an important role in model acceptance” (1999, 15). That’s because the model gives a 
story that relates to the known mechanisms of quantum chromodynamics, the theory that 
is fundamental of this domain.
11
 Not any old model that’s visualizable and intuitively 
plausible will do the job: although empirically inadequate, the bag model is consistent 
with many things the theory says. It may be too bad for the realists and empiricists that 
this model is not empirically adequate, but theoretically, there is little reason why the 
quarks couldn’t be confined this way. Here again is a model highlighting a theoretically 
as well intuitively plausible possibility.  
 
III. Pragmatic understanding 
 
The final kind of understanding in our catalogue, described by de Regt (2014), comes 
from using a theory or model for practical use and manipulation, which lines up closely 
with the other aim of science we discuss in this paper – managing the world. There is 
understanding to be had of the world via a vehicle that helps us manipulate and control it 
– call this pragmatic understanding. De Regt associates understanding with the 
intelligibility of a theory. Intelligibility in this case is pragmatic and contextual. It 
consists in knowing how to use the theory for prediction and manipulation/ control – so 
understanding for him is a skill.  
 
As mentioned earlier, de Regt advances arguments similar to Elgin’s: he criticizes and 
rejects the realist thesis regarding understanding. He then shows how, in trying to predict 
and control (parts of) the world, we employ models and theories that are judged to be 
false. “Whether or not theories or models can be used for understanding phenomena does 
not depend on whether they are accurate representations of a reality underlying the 
phenomena,” (2014, 16) he maintains. (He gives many examples of false theories used 
for domain-specific manipulation and prediction, like Newtonian mechanics.) Nor, we 
add, does it depend on whether they are empirically adequate. Although de Regt doesn’t 
explicitly say much about the empirical adequacy of theories and models for 
understanding, the arguments he gives against requiring a vehicle of understanding to be 
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 See Hartmann (1999) p. 10 for a detailed discussion of this.  
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true apply to requiring it to be empirically adequate as well. We shall say no more about 
this here because we continue this line about models and theories for use and 
manipulation in the next section.  
 
Unification can also supply a kind of pragmatic understanding. As Mary Morgan (2010) 
points out in her work on the travel of facts and techniques from one domain to another, it 
can be extremely useful to see that the laws grouped together under the same unifying 
claim are similar in significant ways. It allows us to use similar methods of study, 
modeling strategies, approximation techniques, and the like, and it suggests analogous 
predictions to look for from one domain to another. This suggests new concepts, new 
theories, and new methods; it helps us advance our sciences at both a theoretical and a 
practical level.  
 
Note that, just as with realist unificatory understanding, a unifying theory can supply 
pragmatic understanding while diminishing empirical adequacy. When it comes to 
borrowing techniques, looking for predictions in one domain analogous to those already 
established in another, and the like, it is the analogies among the unified sub-theories that 
matter, not the empirical adequacy of the unifying theory. The unification may be 
substantially less empirically adequate than the ones being unified. 
 
4. Managing the world around us  
 
Yes, we advocate understanding. But ‘the’ task of science is not to understand the world 
any more than it is to represent the world as it is. There are a great number of tasks we 
can, and should, ask science to undertake. Many can be grouped under the broad aim, ‘to 
change the world’. As mentioned above, according to de Regt (2014) the ability to 
manipulate and control also gives us (pragmatic) understanding of the world– but we take 
this to be a big goal of science in itself, and one we especially care about.  
 
To advocate managing the world as a task for science is to advocate a kind of 
instrumentalism, not in the traditional sense, as an epistemological doctrine, but in the 
sense of Julian Reiss, who teaches, “[S]cience strives ‘to build a ‘toolbox’: its theories, 
models, statements or results aim to provide its users with devices for orienting 
themselves in this world and to mold it into shape according to their values and 
aspirations.” (2012, 364)  
 
Do we need theories that make true theoretical claims in order to mold the world like 
this? No. Here we rehearse the outlines of arguments well known from the works of 
pragmatists and instrumentalists. To manage the world what we need are knowledge and 
practices that we can rely on to generate models that make correct enough predictions 
about what will happen when we act. Sometimes we are reassured that a model will make 
correct predictions because we have good reason to think that the facts supposed in its 
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construction are true. But notoriously, models using radically false assumptions about the 
world can make accurate predictions about targeted outcomes.
12
  
 
This is richly illustrated by Gerd Gigerenzer (1999) in his work on cheap heuristics that 
make us smart. It is also famously argued by Nobel prize winning Chicago School 
economist Milton Friedman (1953) about models in economics. Leaves may not chase 
the sun. But assuming that they do so, he argues, is a good predictor of where they will be 
facing. Similarly, he maintains, it may not be true that people making economic decisions 
are ideally rational. But assuming them to be so can give very good predictions about 
various specific economic outcomes, even though, as with Prescott’s business cycle 
theory, it gets a good many other empirical predictions dramatically wrong. More 
recently in economics, Oxford econometrician David Hendry (2002) urges that it is best 
for forecasting in certain domains of economics to adopt false models that have many 
false empirical consequences rather than to try to model the true causes. That’s because 
in these domains the causes change often, quickly, and unpredictably whereas the kinds 
of far less accurate forecasting models he advocates ‘catch up quickly’ to allow 
reasonably accurate forecasts of the target features. His models, he claims, are good 
enough for what we want to do but they don’t even attempt a true picture of what’s going 
on and they give very false predictions about many non-targeted features.  
 
So, to manage the world we don’t need our theories to get right most of their empirical 
predictions. We need them to be right about exactly the empirical facts we rely on in 
order to bring about the results we want. This may mean that we need to get some 
theoretical facts right as well. But even in the cases where some theoretical truth is 
needed, at most this involves getting right specific theoretical facts that imply those 
conclusions we need to do the job at hand. This is not to say that empirically adequate 
theories are of no use in managing the world. After all, if a theory gets all the empirical 
facts right, it is bound to get right the ones you need on this occasion. On the other hand, 
looking for a theory that gets them all right rather than ones that reliably provide the 
predictions you need is expensive overkill, as in our example of buying a Swiss army 
knife to cut bread.  
 
This underlines one of the reasons we find Douglas's attitude odd by her own standards. 
She urges that a theory that is not empirically adequate "must be corrected to meet the 
minimum requirements as quickly as possible. This doesn't seem to fit with her own 
views about the importance of values in science, especially the importance of 
considerations about what we value, and how much we value it, in setting standards for 
theory acceptability. She is well known for arguing that standards of acceptability should 
depend on the uses to which a theory will be put (2006, 2009). In particular, she is 
concerned with the question, what is the cost if a wrong theory is used versus the cost if a 
theory is rejected yet is correct. For Douglas these costs must be taken into account in 
deciding whether to use a theory or not. Yet it seems for her they do not play a significant 
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 See Robert Northcott (2016) for defense of similar claims to ours. 
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role in deciding whether to make do with a theory that solves the problems we face rather 
than carry on the hunt for one that provides extras that we do not need. 
  
There are of course the usual rejoinders: we never know when a piece of knowledge may 
come in handy; we do – and should – value knowledge for its own sake; sometimes the 
fact that we have no use for at the moment is just the clue we need to come up with 
newer, better theories; or it may be the missing piece that we need for understanding. Yes 
all that is true. And were there no costs in time, effort, money, and talent to hunting 
theories that go beyond our instrumental needs, perhaps we should for just these kinds of 
reasons indulge in empirical adequacy. But there are costs, and the same kinds of reasons 
that move Douglas to count the costs in deciding on theory acceptability argue that we 
should count the costs before pursuing empirical adequacy.  
 
There is another epistemic version of the argument for overkill, this one analogous to the 
case of the shopper who values above all else not having to judge which shops to trust. If 
you knew that your theory was empirically adequate, that would answer big questions for 
you: which of its empirical consequences can be trusted for use? They all could. That of 
course is a big IF. And it's a costly way to decide that a prediction can be trusted: invest 
in the hunt for an empirically adequate theory and in all the empirical and theoretical 
work it takes to warrant confidence that it is so. It is generally cheaper to follow familiar 
practices: trust the consequences of the theory in situations where we have a great deal of 
experience that they give good enough results, build prototypes, overbuild -- put safety 
nets in place -- in case we are wrong, proceed with caution, and pray. We urge that this is 
the safer policy over slavish trust in the putative consequences of well-confirmed theory. 
Also that it is the morally correct one where results really matter. When people's lives 
and welfare are at stake, we should check, check, and double check.  
 
Finally, we should rehearse an old theme from Otto Neurath. It is theories that are 
empirically adequate or not. A theory is empirically adequate if it gets right a good 
enough number of the central empirical facts it predicts. But facts we need to know to 
mold and manage the world are seldom in the domain of any one theory. Even if you 
have marvelous theories you can't just derive what will happen in most real situations 
from them. The theories may provide useful tools but you need to build the prediction, 
not derive it. This will generally take knowledge from a variety of different theories, local 
and concrete knowledge, skill, experienced practices, luck, finesse, and, as above, a great 
deal of trial and error, check, and double check. So even if we follow Douglas's 
injunction to correct our theories as quickly as possible to get them up to the standard of 
empirical adequacy, this will generally not meet the instrumentalists' needs.  
 
Returning to the realist-antirealist divide mentioned at the start, our argument here 
distances us from the realist and antirealist alike. When it is action that we are interested 
in, all and only facts that impact action become important. When it comes to the aims of 
science, we are realist about both theoretical and empirical facts. If we need to get facts 
about some unobservable microbes right in order to cure a stomach ache, then we had 
better strive to get them right. We are equally anti-realists about both empirical facts and 
theoretical facts: those we don’t need. To manage the world, our theories have no need to 
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be either true or empirically adequate. Again, as with the task of understanding, there is 
no privileged place for empirical adequacy in theory choice when we are trying to change 
the world.  
 
5. Some parting thoughts  
 
One might be tempted to think that empirical adequacy can be salvaged as a sine qua non 
of theory choice by adopting a more relaxed characterization of empirical adequacy.
13
 
We think this won't work for a couple of reasons. First, as we argued, some jobs that 
scientific models or theories are expected to do don't require them to get any empirical 
facts right, like Galilean thought experiments, which necessarily distort the setting in 
which the effect occurs so the effect predicted is different, often dramatically, from the 
effect that happens. Second, we repeat that we do not deny that often, maybe always, a 
model or theory has to get some facts right to be acceptable. But again, what kinds of 
facts these are will vary with the purposes to be served. There is a relaxed formulation of 
an adequacy criterion that works, but it is trivial and it does not focus on the empirical: 
'For a theory to be acceptable, it must be right (enough) about those facts that it needs to 
get right to do the job in view.'  
 
To make our point clearer, it might help to reframe our opening question “What's so 
special about empirical adequacy?” as: “What's so special about the empirical 
consequences of a theory?” The answer presumably is that the empirical is our epistemic 
access to what the world is like; the empirical consequences of a theory/model are our 
indirect check that things are as it says. But for many jobs, we do not require this kind of 
indirect check that what the theory/model says about the facts we need for the job is 
likely to be right. We can have many other reasons for expecting this (like frequent 
success in the past or a good enough grasp on what's happening to see why the model 
should get right what we need). Of course the empirical consequences of a model matter 
to managing the world with it. But as we have stressed, not all of them. A theory/model 
that gets right whatever it is we need to get right may get most if not all of its empirical 
consequences wrong, even its most central ones.  
 
As we have stressed, there are many jobs that science is called on to perform, and which 
is most important at which place and time depends on context. Yet little attention is paid 
in the philosophy of science to what makes a theory fit for these jobs. True, we do 
sometimes discuss 'virtues' that may be desired in a theory beyond empirical adequacy, 
but this is almost always in the context of the underdetermination issue: how to choose 
among theories that are empirically adequate.
14
 We find this odd. One may argue that the 
virtues called into play in these cases are sufficiently truth indicative that possessing them 
makes it likely that the claims are true. But that is a hard argument to make and failing 
that argument, it seems we knowingly pick from among a great many incompatible 
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 Some people including Christian Wüthrich (in conversations) and an anonymous 
referee for this paper have suggested this to us explicitly. 
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 See Matthew Brown (2012) for a critique of such a setting.  
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theories – including all the unconceived ones – that seem to have equal claims to truth, 
one theory that has some extra virtue like simplicity or plausibility. That is what's odd. If 
in the end we are going to choose one theory from a bunch of others that have equal 
claims to truth because it does some job we want to do, why constrain the choice to just 
the theoretically true or the empirically adequate ones to begin with? Why not go for the 
best we can conceive that will do the job at hand well, regardless of its truthfulness about 
either theoretical or empirical facts unnecessary to the job?  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
We suggest two take-home messages:  
a. Truth is no trump, nor is empirical adequacy. These form one small part of what we 
aim for in doing science and in investing in it. For much else, empirical adequacy has no 
special role to play and alternatives are very welcome if they can do the job. So what’s so 
special about empirical adequacy?  
b. We need to keep hunting for better theories and keep constructing better models. But 
in doing so, we must not put all our eggs in the empirical adequacy basket. There's no 
sufficient reason to think that's the best path to models and theories that will help us do 
what we want.  
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